The dual of Bertrand with homogenous products is Cournot with perfect complements

Paolo Bertoletti ()

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2022, vol. 10, issue 2, No 1, 183-189

Abstract: Abstract The quantity-setting (Cournot) oligopoly with perfect complements is dual to the price-setting (Betrand) oligopoly with homogeneous goods. Under mild technical conditions the former setting has a unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium with null quantities. As an implication, the provision of perfectly complementary goods might actually be impossible, if the market is not either perfectly competitive or monopolized.

Keywords: Cournot duopoly; Bertrand duopoly; Perfect complements; Homogeneous products (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D43 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00225-3

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