The dual of Bertrand with homogeneous products is Cournot with perfect complements
Paolo Bertoletti ()
No 490, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics
The quantity-setting (Cournot) oligopoly with perfect complements is dual to the price-setting (Bertrand) oligopoly with homogeneous goods. Under mild technical conditions, the former setting has a unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium with null quantities.
Keywords: Cournot duopoly; Bertrand duopoly; perfect complements; homogeneous products. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D43 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-ore
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