Axiomatization of the core of positive games

Pierre Dehez ()

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2024, vol. 12, issue 2, No 9, 219-228

Abstract: Abstract We show that, when restricted to positive games, games whose Harsanyi dividends are non-negative, additivity together with efficiency, individual rationality and the null player property, characterizes the core as a maximal set-valued solution.

Keywords: Core; Convex games; Positive games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-024-00276-8

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