Axiomatization of the core of positive games

Pierre Dehez ()

No 2024011, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The core is an additive solution on the set of convex transferable utility games. We show that additivity, together with efficiency, individual rationality and the null player property, characterizes the core of positive games.

Keywords: Core; convex games; positive games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9
Date: 2024-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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Journal Article: Axiomatization of the core of positive games (2024)
Working Paper: Axiomatization of the core of positive games (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2024011

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