Axiomatization of the core of positive games

Pierre Dehez ()

No 3305, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We show that, when restricted to positive games, games whose Harsanyi dividends are non-negative, additivity together with efficiency, individual rationality and the null player property, characterizes the core as a maximal set-valued solution.

Keywords: Core; Convex games; Positive games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10
Date: 2024-10-05
Note: In: Economic Theory Bulletin, 2024
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Journal Article: Axiomatization of the core of positive games (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvrp:3305

DOI: 10.1007/s40505-024-00276-8

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