Strong dictatorship via ratio-scale measurable utilities: a simpler proof

Jacob M. Nebel ()
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Jacob M. Nebel: Princeton University

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2023, vol. 11, issue 1, No 8, 106 pages

Abstract: Abstract Tsui and Weymark (Econ Theory 10:241–256, 1997, https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050156 ) have shown that the only continuous social welfare orderings on the whole Euclidean space which satisfy the weak Pareto principle and are invariant to individual-specific similarity transformations of utilities are strongly dictatorial. Their proof relies on functional equation arguments which are quite complex. This note provides a simpler proof of their theorem.

Keywords: Arrow’s impossibility theorem; Strong dictatorship; social welfare orderings; Ratio-scale measurability; Informational invariance conditions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00244-8

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