Is there free riding in group contests?

Aner Sela

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2023, vol. 11, issue 2, No 3, 201 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study best-of-two contests between two symmetric groups of players. Each group includes n heterogeneous players who have resource budgets that decrease in the second stage proportionally to the resource allocated in the first stage. We demonstrate that in our group contests complete “free riding” does not necessarily exist, namely, there is always a subgame perfect equilibrium in which either all the players in a group allocate positive resources in both stages or just some of them, but never only one player allocates a resource in any stage when all the others in his group are free riders.

Keywords: Groups contests; Best-of-two contests; Free riders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00250-w

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