A remark on discontinuous games with asymmetric information and ambiguity
Wei He () and
Nicholas C. Yannelis
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Wei He: The University of Iowa
Nicholas C. Yannelis: The University of Iowa
Economic Theory Bulletin, 2017, vol. 5, issue 1, 119-126
Abstract We consider discontinuous games with asymmetric information and ambiguity (i.e., players have maximin preferences à la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). It is shown that the existence of equilibria follows directly from the existence of Nash equilibria in every ex post game if all players are endowed with the maximin preferences. This is false for discontinuous games where players have Bayesian preferences as shown in He and Yannelis (2015a).
Keywords: Discontinuous game; Asymmetric information; Ambiguity; Maximin expected utility; C62; D81; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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