Information, ambiguity and price equilibrium

R. R. Routledge ()
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R. R. Routledge: University of Liverpool

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2017, vol. 5, issue 2, No 8, 199-214

Abstract: Abstract This work analyzes a price choice game with discontinuous payoffs in which sellers may have asymmetric information about the state of the market. The prices which sellers post in the market must be measurable with respect to their private information and sellers are assumed to have ex ante maximin expected utilities. Easily verified conditions upon the primitives which guarantee the existence of a pure strategy price equilibrium in the game, under both equal sharing and winner-takes-all sharing at price ties, are presented. The existence proofs are direct and constructive.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Discontinuous payoffs; Ambiguity; Maximin utilities; Price equilibrium; Ex ante payoffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-017-0114-7

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