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Employment lotteries, endogenous firm formation and the aspiration core

Camelia Bejan and Juan Camilo Gómez ()
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Juan Camilo Gómez: University of Washington-Bothell

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2017, vol. 5, issue 2, 215-226

Abstract: Abstract The paper shows that the aspiration core of a TU-game coincides with the set of competitive wages arising in a labor market economy in which time is indivisible, but workers and firms can sign contingent labor contracts and trade in employment lotteries. The set of firms that are active in the market is endogenously determined at equilibrium and it coincides with the generating collection of the corresponding aspiration core allocation.

Keywords: Indivisible labor; Employment lotteries; Firm formation; Aspiration core; Market games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 D60 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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