An agency relationship under general conditions of uncertainty: a game theory application to the doctor–patient interaction

Dionysius Glycopantis () and Charitini Stavropoulou
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Dionysius Glycopantis: City, University of London
Charitini Stavropoulou: City, University of London

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2018, vol. 6, issue 1, No 2, 15-28

Abstract: Abstract The supply of information, particularly of bad news, in an agency relationship is a sensitive issue. We employ a game theory approach to investigate conflicts in the particular case of the doctor–patient relationship when information affects the emotions of patients. The doctor does not know the type of agent and the patient does not know how much information he is given. Hence, the paper obtains results when there is conflict, rather than common interest in the objectives of the two parties. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium describes beliefs and strategies which guarantee adherence to the doctor’s recommendation. We show also that the patient may non-adhere to the recommendation not only when the doctor fails to identify the patient’s needs but also if he falsely believes that the doctor has not done so.

Keywords: Doctor–patient relationship; Adherence; Psychological expected utility; Non-cooperative game theory; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D03 I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-017-0120-9

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