Implementation with socially responsible agents

Makoto Hagiwara, Hirofumi Yamamura () and Takehiko Yamato ()
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Hirofumi Yamamura: Hokusei Gakuen University
Takehiko Yamato: Tokyo Institute of Technology

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2018, vol. 6, issue 1, No 5, 55-62

Abstract: Abstract We consider the implementation problem with socially responsible agents who want to report a socially desirable outcome to a mechanism designer. We design a simple and natural mechanism in which each agent reports an outcome. We show that if there are at least two socially responsible agents, then the mechanism implements any unanimous social choice correspondence in Nash equilibria with at least three agents.

Keywords: Social responsibility; Nash implementation; Outcome mechanism; Common knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-017-0123-6

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