Subjects in the lab, activists in the field: public goods and punishment

Chetan Dave, Sjur Hamre (), Curtis Kephart () and Alicja Reuben ()
Additional contact information
Sjur Hamre: Duke University
Curtis Kephart: R-Studio
Alicja Reuben: NYUAD

Eurasian Economic Review, 2020, vol. 10, issue 3, No 8, 533-553

Abstract: Abstract We compare standard (laboratory) and non-standard (field) subject pool behavior in an extensive form public goods game with random punishment. Our experimental investigation is motivated by real-world ‘Activists’ encouraging public goods provision by firms; an activity known as corporate social responsibility. We find that relative to laboratory subjects, activists in Mumbai are more willing to settle at the Nash equilibrium of the game (which entails increased provision of public goods) and are more willing to punish non-cooperative firm behavior even if such punishments hurt their own payoffs.

Keywords: Public goods; Punishment; Non-standard subject pool; C92; C93; D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40822-020-00144-3 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Subjects in the Lab, Activists in the Field: Public Goods and Punishment (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:eurase:v:10:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s40822-020-00144-3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/40822

DOI: 10.1007/s40822-020-00144-3

Access Statistics for this article

Eurasian Economic Review is currently edited by Dorothea Schäfer

More articles in Eurasian Economic Review from Springer, Eurasia Business and Economics Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().