Subjects in the Lab, Activists in the Field: Public Goods and Punishment
Chetan Dave (),
Sjur Hamre (),
Curtis Kephart () and
Alicja Reuben ()
Additional contact information
Sjur Hamre: Duke University
Curtis Kephart: R-Studio
Alicja Reuben: New York University Abu Dhabi
No 2019-6, Working Papers from University of Alberta, Department of Economics
We compare standard (laboratory) and non-standard (field) subject pool behavior in an extensive form public goods game with random punishment. Our experimental investigation is motivated by real-world ‘Activists’ encouraging public goods provision by firms; an activity known as corporate social responsibility. We find that relative to laboratory subjects, activists in Mumbai are more willing to settle at the Nash equilibrium of the game (which entails increased provision of public goods) and are more willing to punish non-cooperative firm behavior even if such punishments hurt their own payoffs.
Keywords: Public goods; punishment; non-standard subject pool (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 C93 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 109 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.ualberta.ca/~econwps/2019/wp2019-06.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:albaec:2019_006
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of Alberta, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joseph Marchand ().