Resolving Group Choice Paradoxes Using Probabilistic and Fuzzy Concepts

Hannu Nurmi
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Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2001, vol. 10, issue 2, No 6, 177-199

Abstract: Abstract The standard assumption of modern social choice theory is that the individuals are endowed with complete and transitive preference relations over the decision alternatives. A large number of incompatibility results has been achieved regarding aggregation of these kinds of preferences. Yet, most voting procedures make no use of this information. Instead they essentially cut down the information provided by the voters. In this paper we deal with some alternatives to the complete and transitive voter preference assumption. Particular attention is paid to imprecise notions: probabilistic and fuzzy preference relations. Rather than establishing new impossibility results, our focus is in resolving various voting paradoxes using imprecise preference concepts.

Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1008747918121

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