On Creating and Claiming Value in Negotiations

Mehmet Bac ()
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Mehmet Bac: Bilkent University

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2001, vol. 10, issue 3, No 2, 237-251

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents a negotiation model that includes value creation. It shows that creative negotiation efforts tend to intensify toward the deadline, and that the deadline is determined endogenously by the tension between two motives, creating more value and claiming from existing value. When the parties can present “misleading” offers in order to claim rather than create value, the outcome in early negotiation rounds may display an impasse where any proposal is rejected without inspection, while negotiation activities such as value creation through “sincere” offers and inspection of clauses intensify toward the deadline.

Keywords: dynamic game; negotiations; contributive efforts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1011210015279

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