Media Appropriateness in the Conduct and Discovery of Deceptive Communication: The Relative Influence of Richness and Synchronicity

John R. Carlson () and Joey F. George ()
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John R. Carlson: Baylor University
Joey F. George: Florida State University

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2004, vol. 13, issue 2, No 6, 210 pages

Abstract: Abstract We investigate the role that media synchronicity and media richness play in the particular communication context of deception. Hypotheses are developed based on prior models of mediated-deception as well as media richness theory and channel expansion theory. Two survey-based studies were conducted to look at this construct from the separate standpoints of the deceiver and the receiver. Study 1 (the deceiver) provided respondents with a detailed scenario and asked them to select a medium to use to accomplish a specific deceptive act. Results indicate a general preference for highly synchronous (and non-reprocessable) media. Study 2 (the receiver) focused each respondent on a specific medium and used 4 short scenarios to investigate how confidence in their ability to detect deception was affected by synchronicity, media richness, media familiarity, and co-participant (deceiver) familiarity. When making media selections, results indicate that synchronicity and media familiarity are relatively less important to receivers; instead, receivers engaged in deception detection clearly value rich media and co-participants with whom they have more experience and familiarity.

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1023/B:GRUP.0000021841.01346.35

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