R&D organization and technology transfer

Arijit Mukherjee and Sugata Marjit

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2004, vol. 13, issue 3, No 3, 243-258

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we consider a Cournot duopoly model to examine the effects of licensing on R&D organization. When firms do cooperative R&D to share the cost of R&D, possibility of licensing can influence the decision on R&D organization. But, if the firms do cooperative R&D to avoid duplication in R&D process, possibility of licensing may influence the decision on R&D organization, provided one firm behaves like a Stackelberg leader in the product market.

Keywords: licensing; multiple research project; research joint venture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1023/B:GRUP.0000031079.32373.a4

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