Assignment of Weights to the Member States of the European Union in Order to Model Their Relative Power Positions

Freerk A. Lootsma ()
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Freerk A. Lootsma: Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Information Technology and Systems

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2004, vol. 13, issue 4, No 1, 313 pages

Abstract: Abstract Relative power of the member states of the European Union is expressed by weights assigned to the states on the basis of five criteria: population, gross domestic product, national area, political stability, and contributions to the European culture and civilization. The underlying idea is that ratios of these weights should approximate ratios of the five corresponding indicators. In addition, relative power can be moderated when the large member states save their power for issues about which they care more, and it can be amplified when the large states coordinate their efforts in order to dominate a coalition of smaller states. The results of the analysis are used to sketch a power distribution in the enlarged European Union.

Keywords: allocation criteria; geometric means; logarithmic regression; qualified majority voting; relative power; salience of issues; weight elicitation; weighted judgement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1023/B:GRUP.0000042860.57065.d0

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