Getting the Floor: Motive-Consistent Strategy and Individual Outcomes in Multi-Party Negotiations

Mary C. Kern (), Jeanne M. Brett () and Laurie R. Weingart ()
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Mary C. Kern: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Jeanne M. Brett: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Laurie R. Weingart: Carnegie Mellon University

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2005, vol. 14, issue 1, No 3, 41 pages

Abstract: Abstract Social motives influence negotiators’ actions and reactions. In this study we proposed that social motives moderate the relationship between persistence in the use of integrative or distributive negotiation strategy and individual outcomes in 33 four-person mixed-motive negotiations. Cooperative negotiators who persisted in using integrative strategy achieved higher outcomes than those who did not persist. Persistence in the use of integrative strategy did not pay off for individualistic negotiators in this multi-party setting. We theorized that this pattern of results was due to cooperative and individualistic negotiators using strategy differently. We found that cooperative negotiators used more motive-consistent integrative strategy and less motive-inconsistent distributive strategy than individualistic negotiators, whose pattern of strategy use was consistent with their self-interested motives, providing evidence for our motive consistency theory.

Keywords: multi-party negotiation; individual outcome; negotiation; social motives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-005-3874-7

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