On the Closeness Aspect of Three Voting Rules: Borda – Copeland – Maximin

Christian Klamler

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2005, vol. 14, issue 3, No 4, 233-240

Abstract: Abstract This paper provides a comparison of three voting rules, the Borda rule, the Copeland rule and the maximin rule. Our analysis based on the rankings derived from those voting rules will shed new light on existing comparisons based on “closeness” between the three voting rules under investigation. In particular it will be shown that both, the rankings derived from the Borda rule and the maximin rule and the rankings derived from the Copeland rule and the maximin rule, will be exactly the opposite for certain preference profiles.

Keywords: Borda rule; Copeland rule; maximin rule; distances; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-005-0958-3

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