Preference Structures of Negotiators and Negotiation Outcomes

Rudolf Vetschera ()
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Rudolf Vetschera: University of Vienna

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2006, vol. 15, issue 2, No 2, 125 pages

Abstract: Abstract Using a database collected during about 3,000 negotiation experiments, this paper analyzes how specific features of utility functions of negotiators, like attribute weights, monotonicity and convexity of marginal utility functions, are reflected in the outcomes of negotiations. We find that compromise values are to a considerable extent influenced by the utility functions. There are also significant impacts on the likelihood of achieving a compromise, but the model fit is considerably less than for compromise values.

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-006-9023-0

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