Multi-Party Negotiation When Agents Have Subjective Estimates of Bargaining Powers

Nicolas Querou, Patrick Rio and Mabel Tidball ()
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Patrick Rio: INRA LAMETA

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2007, vol. 16, issue 5, No 1, 417-436

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents a method for generating Pareto-optimal solutions in multi-party negotiations. In this iterative method, decision makers (DMs) formulate proposals that yield a minimum payoff to their opponents. Each proposal belongs to the efficient frontier, DMs try to adjust to a common one. In this setting, each DM is supposed to have a given bargaining power. More precisely each DM is supposed to have a subjective estimate of the power of the different parties. We study the convergence of the method, and provide examples where there is no possible agreement resulting from it.

Keywords: adjustment procedure; multi-party negotiation; Pareto-optimality; bargaining power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-006-9058-2

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