Violations of Independence under Amendment and Plurality Rules with Anonymous Voters

Boniface Mbih and Issofa Moyouwou
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Issofa Moyouwou: Université de Yaoundé 1

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2008, vol. 17, issue 4, No 2, 287-302

Abstract: Abstract Under the impartial anonymous culture assumption (IAC), we evaluate the proportion of anonymous profiles at which the amendment and plurality voting procedures violate the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). We also examine the relation to single-peakedness of preferences and election of a Condorcet winner.

Keywords: Independence of irrelevant alternatives; Amendment rule; Plurality rule; Impartial anonymous culture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-007-9094-6

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