A Cooperative Bargaining Approach to the Assignment Market

Marina Núñez () and Carles Rafels ()
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Carles Rafels: University of Barcelona

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2008, vol. 17, issue 6, No 5, 553-563

Abstract: Abstract For each assignment market, an associated bargaining problem is defined and some bargaining solutions to this problem are analyzed. For a particular choice of the disagreement point, the Nash solution and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution coincide and give the midpoint between the buyers-optimal core allocation and the sellers-optimal core allocation, and thus they belong to the core.

Keywords: Assignment game; Core; Bargaining problem; Nash solution; Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-008-9111-4

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