Searching Pareto Optimal Solutions for the Problem of Forming and Restructuring Coalitions in Multi-Agent Systems

Philippe Caillou (), Samir Aknine () and Suzanne Pinson ()
Additional contact information
Philippe Caillou: LRI, Université Paris Sud 11, Bat 490
Samir Aknine: LIESP, Université Claude Bernard-Lyon 1
Suzanne Pinson: LAMSADE, Université Paris IX Dauphine

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2010, vol. 19, issue 1, No 2, 7-37

Abstract: Abstract Coordination is one of the fundamental research issues in distributed artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Current multi-agent coalition formation methods present two limits: First, computation must be completely restarted when a change occurs. Second, utility functions of the agents are either global or aggregated. We present a new algorithm to cope with these limits. The first part of this paper presents a coalition formation method for multi-agent systems which finds a Pareto optimal solution without aggregating the preferences of the agents. This protocol is adapted to problems requiring coordination by coalition formation, where it is undesirable, or not possible, to aggregate the preferences of the agents. The second part of this paper proposes an extension of this method enabling dynamic restructuring of coalitions when changes occur in the system.

Keywords: Multi-agent system; Coalitions; Preferences; Aggregation; Reorganization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10726-009-9183-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:grdene:v:19:y:2010:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-009-9183-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10726/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10726-009-9183-9

Access Statistics for this article

Group Decision and Negotiation is currently edited by Gregory E. Kersten

More articles in Group Decision and Negotiation from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().