Modeling the Caspian Sea Negotiations

Majid Sheikhmohammady (), D. Marc Kilgour () and Keith W. Hipel ()
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Majid Sheikhmohammady: University of Waterloo
D. Marc Kilgour: Wilfrid Laurier University
Keith W. Hipel: University of Waterloo

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2010, vol. 19, issue 2, No 4, 149-168

Abstract: Abstract The objective of this study is to identify techniques for predicting the outcome of a negotiation and then apply them to the current negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which has been in dispute since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The five coastal states—Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan—entered negotiations in 1993, but have not yet agreed on who owns the waters or the oil and natural gas beneath them. We identify the five well-defined options for resolving the dispute and then discuss the states’ preferences regarding these options. We apply some well-known social choice rules to find the “socially optimal” resolution. Then we review several versions of Fallback Bargaining, which aims to minimize the maximum dissatisfaction of the bargainers, and apply them to the dispute. Finally, we represent the dispute in financial terms and apply several well-known bankruptcy procedures, which are fair division methods for settling monetary claims. We end with some suggestions on how the value of the Caspian seabed resources could be allocated among the five Caspian states.

Keywords: Multilateral negotiations; Social choice rules; Fallback bargaining; Bankruptcy procedures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-008-9121-2

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