Strategic Aspects of the 1995 and 2004 EU Enlargements

László Kóczy ()

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2010, vol. 19, issue 3, No 4, 267-277

Abstract: Abstract While the 1995 entrants to the EU are by now fully integrated, those joining in 2004 still “enjoy” a secondary status for a number of years. We attribute this difference to the fact that unlike the former EFTA members joining in 1995, the 2004 entrants formed a group with heterogenous interests, one that lacked the same strong internal economic ties. Not being able to act as a unified block they had a considerably weaker bargaining position. We support our arguments by qualitative results from a simple model, a dynamic partition function game based on Yi (Games Econ Behav 20:201–237, 1997) and Morelli and Penelle (Economic integration as a partition function game 1997).

Keywords: European integration; Externalities; Path dependence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-009-9161-2

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