Negotiation for Cooperation in Logistics Networks: An Experimental Study

Daniel Rief () and Clemens Dinther ()
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Daniel Rief: Technische Universität Berlin
Clemens Dinther: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2010, vol. 19, issue 3, No 1, 226 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper investigates the negotiation problem in a supply chain in which a supplier can realize cost savings if she reaches an agreement with a retailer to use the retailers accurate market data for production planning. We study the participants behavior in an asymmetric and a symmetric information scenario and model the experimental study as a reverse ultimatum game. The main finding is that the revelation of information in the game leads to higher payoffs for both parties and to a higher welfare.

Keywords: Information sharing; Cooperation; Supply chain; Negotiation; Ultimatum game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-010-9193-7

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