No Show Paradox in Condorcet k-voting Procedures

Joaquín Pérez, José L. Jimeno () and Estefanía García ()
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José L. Jimeno: Universidad de Alcalá
Estefanía García: Universidad de Alcalá

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2012, vol. 21, issue 3, No 3, 303 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we extend the negative known results about No Show Paradox in Condorcet voting functions and correspondences to the contexts of k-functions and k-correspondences, in which the outcome of the voting process is a unique k-committee (set of k candidates) or a family of k-committees. The main result of the paper states that for every Condorcet k-function and for every Condorcet k-correspondence, there are situations in which every optimistic or pessimistic voter with some specific preferences could manipulate the election by abstaining.

Keywords: Participation; Manipulation; Abstention paradox; Condorcet; k-functions voting rules; k-correspondences voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-010-9191-9

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