Formal Analysis of Multilateral Negotiations Over the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea

Majid Sheikhmohammady (), Keith W. Hipel () and D. Marc Kilgour ()
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Majid Sheikhmohammady: K. N. Toosi University of Technology
Keith W. Hipel: University of Waterloo
D. Marc Kilgour: University of Waterloo

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2012, vol. 21, issue 3, No 4, 305-329

Abstract: Abstract The Evolutionary Model for Multilateral Negotiations (EMMN) is utilized to identify the most likely outcome of the Caspian Sea negotiations. Since 1993, the five littoral states have been negotiating over the legal status of the Caspian Sea but have not reached any agreement, causing a Tragedy of the Commons to unfold. EMMN is a methodology that focuses on asymmetric multilateral negotiations, like those over the Caspian Sea, in which each negotiator seeks to reach the most preferable outcome for which he or she can gain enough support from other negotiators. An advantage of the EMMN approach is that it considers the power of the negotiators as a determining factor in the final resolution. The results of this analysis are compared with those of other studies on Caspian Sea conflict where the powers of decision makers are not taken into account.

Keywords: Analysis; Caspian Sea; Evolutionary model; Multilateral negotiations; Prediction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-010-9195-5

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