Allocating Profit Among Rational Players in a Fuzzy Coalition: A Game Theoretic Model

Surajit Borkotokey () and Rupok Neog ()
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Rupok Neog: Dibrugarh University

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2012, vol. 21, issue 4, No 1, 439-459

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, the problem of allocation of the profit, obtained from a fuzzy coalition, among its players is considered. It is argued that this allocation is influenced by satisfaction of the players in regards to better performance and success within a cooperative endeavour. Our model is based on the real life situations, where possibly one or more players compromise on their payoffs in order to help forming a coalition. We have developed a dynamic approach to obtain a suitable solution to the corresponding cooperative fuzzy game. Further, the notion of a penalty among the bargaining players is introduced. This would inflict them to reasonable demands only.

Keywords: Fuzzy coalitions; Rational player; Exact offer; Penalty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-010-9217-3

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