The Majority Rule with Arbitrators

Antonio Quesada

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2013, vol. 22, issue 2, No 8, 330 pages

Abstract: Abstract The majority rule with arbitrators is the (relative) majority rule supplemented by the indifference-breaking rule according to which, in case of social indifference under the majority rule, the social preference coincides with the preference of the non-indifferent individual ranked higher in an exogenous ranking of the individuals. For the case of preferences over two alternatives, a characterization of this rule is suggested that relies on axioms of efficiency, inter-anonymity, intra-anonymity, parity, and reducibility. It is also provided a characterization of the set of rules consisting of the majority rule and the majority rule with arbitrators.

Keywords: Social welfare function; Relative majority rule; Tie-breaking rule; Axiomatic characterization; Two alternatives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-011-9264-4

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