Menu Dependence and Group Decision Making

Sususmu Cato ()

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2014, vol. 23, issue 3, No 11, 577 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper is concerned with the problem of group decision making. We introduce the notion of a collective system rule. A collective system rule maps each preference profile to a group-preference system, which is a collection of social preferences on the subsets of the alternatives. By formulating the Arrovian conditions, we show the Arrow-type impossibility theorems. We also discuss how our approach is related to the standard group decision-making process.

Keywords: Collective system rule; Group decision making; Arrow’s impossibility theorem; Preference system; Nestedness; Menu-dependent preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-013-9343-9

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