Social Planner’s Solution for the Caspian Sea Conflict

Kaveh Madani, Majid Sheikhmohammady, Soroush Mokhtari, Mojtaba Moradi and Petros Xanthopoulos
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Majid Sheikhmohammady: Tarbiat Modares University
Soroush Mokhtari: University of Central Florida
Mojtaba Moradi: K. N. Toosi University of Technology
Petros Xanthopoulos: University of Central Florida

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2014, vol. 23, issue 3, No 12, 579-596

Abstract: Abstract This paper evaluates the proposed alternatives for sharing the Caspian Sea from the social planner’s or systems-level perspective with respect to the stakeholders’ utilities from the oil and natural gas resources of the sea. Different multi-criteria decision-making methods, namely dominance, maximin, lexicography, simple additive weighting, and TOPSIS are applied to determine the social planner’s ranking of these alternatives. Results suggest the Condominium governance regime as the most promising division method. Bankruptcy rules and cooperative game theory methods can be considered as the other socially optimal resolutions to the conflict over sharing the Caspian Sea energy resources among its five littoral countries. Consideration of these methods in negotiations may help with resolving the existing deadlock, which has been in place for two decades.

Keywords: Conflict resolution; Multi-criteria; Decision-making; Social planner; Caspian Sea (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-013-9345-7

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