A Way to Play Claims Problems

José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez ()

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2014, vol. 23, issue 3, No 14, 617-627

Abstract: Abstract Commitment among agents is always difficult, especially when a scarce resource is to be shared. On the one hand, there are many possible ways to assign the available amount; on the other hand, each agent is motivated to propose a distribution that maximizes her award. In this paper, we propose a mechanism that combines the diminishing claims (Chun in Math Soc Sci 17(3):245–261, 1989) and the unanimous concessions (Herrero in Advances in economic design. Springer, Berlin, 2003) procedures, thereby obtaining a new justification of rules based on averaging.

Keywords: Claims problems; Unanimous concessions procedure; Diminishing claims mechanism; Average (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-013-9347-5

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