Interactive Alignment or Complex Reasoning: Reciprocal Adaptation and Framing in Group Decision and Negotiation

Bilyana Martinovski ()
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Bilyana Martinovski: University of Stockholm

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2014, vol. 23, issue 3, No 8, 497-514

Abstract: Abstract The purpose of this paper is to explore how speakers enter each other’s reference frames during interactive decision-making and negotiation. It examines the relation between reciprocal adaptation, Interactive Alignment Theory and Theory of Theory-of-Mind by using ethno-methodological analysis of audio-recorded activities. The study concludes that problem reframing is affected by interactivity and led by discursive mechanisms such as reciprocal adaptation, which realize as two types of embodied, cognitive and emotional processing: interactive alignment and complex reasoning. The type of activity predicts the functions of cognitive processing. In strategic negotiations, such as plea bargains, interactive alignment realizes complex emotionally loaded Theory-of-Mind reasoning. In addition, the analysis indicates that the participation of a judge does not inhibit the anchoring effect but rather reinforces it interactively. The study suggests a tentative framework for analysis of framing by describing cognitive processing in terms of temporal, consciousness and communicative characteristics. Multi-functionality of discourse features demands careful study of context rather than assumption of linguistic-discursive functions.

Keywords: Decision-making; Negotiation; Interactive alignment; Theory of Theory of Mind; Reciprocal adaptation; Discourse analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-013-9363-5

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