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“I am Disgusted by Your Proposal”: The Effects of a Strategic Flinch in Negotiations

Neil E. Fassina () and Glen R. Whyte
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Neil E. Fassina: Northern Alberta Institute of Technology
Glen R. Whyte: University of Toronto

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2014, vol. 23, issue 4, No 11, 920 pages

Abstract: Abstract To flinch in negotiations refers to verbal or physical displays of shock, disgust, or disbelief made in response to an opening offer. We investigated the impact of advising negotiators to strategically flinch in distributive bargaining. In experiment 1, negotiators who flinched claimed significantly more value than negotiators who did not flinch. Targets of a flinch, however, viewed the negotiation relationship less positively than negotiators in a control condition. Yet, flinching appeared to have no effect on the target negotiators’ perceptions of how well they did. In experiment 2, the notion that a subtle flinch might still facilitate value claiming but without imperilling the bargaining relationship was supported. Implications for negotiation theory and practice, and directions for future research, are discussed.

Keywords: Negotiation; Strategic flinch; First offer; Distributive; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-013-9360-8

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