Vacuous Information Affects Bargaining

Christian Korth and J. Philipp Reiß ()
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J. Philipp Reiß: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2014, vol. 23, issue 4, No 12, 936 pages

Abstract: Abstract We introduce vacuous information into buyer-seller ultimatum exchanges and provide evidence that it can affect bargaining outcomes. Notably bargaining behavior is affected asymmetrically in a way that leads allocative efficiency to respond negatively. Our results are consistent with self-serving bias that commands players to interpret vacuous information in a self-serving way.

Keywords: Ultimatum game; Vacuous information; Experiment; Bargaining; Self-serving bias; Anchoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-013-9361-7

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