Leveraging ICT Capabilities in Potentially Deceptive Interactions: An Integrated Theoretical Model to Improve Detectability

Matthew L. Jensen () and Laku Chidambaram ()
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Matthew L. Jensen: University of Oklahoma
Laku Chidambaram: University of Oklahoma

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2015, vol. 24, issue 2, No 4, 298 pages

Abstract: Abstract With the proliferating use of information and communication technologies (ICTs), deception is increasingly being perpetrated through technology-mediated channels. Deception can result in substantial costs to individuals and organizations. However, the mechanisms by which ICT capabilities influence the detection of deception remain largely unexplored. This paper discusses how specific ICT capabilities can be leveraged to detect deception before, during and after the exchange of deceptive messages. We develop an integrated theoretical model and detail propositions grouped under two broad media capabilities—transmissibility and extensibility—derived from Saussurean structuralist theory that views ideas and artifacts in terms of binary opposition. Further, our theoretical model includes two key contingencies that affect deception detection—the overtness of deception and the skill disparity between the deceiver and the receiver. Finally, we conclude by discussing the implications of our theory for practice and offer suggestions for future research.

Keywords: Deception; Deception detection; Information and communication technologies; Non-collaborative interaction; Media selection; ICT capabilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-014-9389-3

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