A Group Decision-Making Methodology with Incomplete Individual Beliefs Applied to e-Democracy

Alfonso Mateos (), Antonio Jiménez-Martín () and Sixto Ríos-Insua ()
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Alfonso Mateos: Technical University of Madrid
Antonio Jiménez-Martín: Technical University of Madrid
Sixto Ríos-Insua: Technical University of Madrid

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2015, vol. 24, issue 4, No 6, 633-653

Abstract: Abstract We consider the situation where there are several alternatives for investing a quantity of money to achieve a set of objectives. The choice of which alternative to apply depends on how citizens and political representatives perceive that such objectives should be achieved. All citizens with the right to vote can express their preferences in the decision-making process. These preferences may be incomplete. Political representatives represent the citizens who have not taken part in the decision-making process. The weight corresponding to political representatives depends on the number of citizens that have intervened in the decision-making process. The methodology we propose needs the participants to specify for each alternative how they rate the different attributes and the relative importance of attributes. On the basis of this information an expected utility interval is output for each alternative. To do this, an evidential reasoning approach is applied. This approach improves the insightfulness and rationality of the decision-making process using a belief decision matrix for problem modeling and the Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence for attribute aggregation. Finally, we propose using the distances of each expected utility interval from the maximum and the minimum utilities to rank the alternative set. The basic idea is that an alternative is ranked first if its distance to the maximum utility is the smallest, and its distance to the minimum utility is the greatest. If only one of these conditions is satisfied, a distance ratio is then used.

Keywords: Group decision-making; Incomplete individual beliefs; Expected utility; e-Democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-014-9401-y

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