Positional Voting Systems Generated by Cumulative Standings Functions

Bonifacio Llamazares and Teresa Peña ()
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Teresa Peña: Universidad de Valladolid

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2015, vol. 24, issue 5, No 2, 777-801

Abstract: Abstract Positional voting systems are a class of voting systems where voters rank order the candidates from best to worst and a set of winners is selected using the positions of the candidates in the voters’ preference orders. Although scoring rules are the best known positional voting systems, this class includes other voting systems proposed in the literature as, for example, the Majoritarian Compromise or the $$q$$ q -Approval Fallback Bargaining. In this paper we show that some of these positional voting systems can be integrated in a model based on cumulative standings functions. The proposed model allows us to establish a general framework for the analysis of these voting systems, to extend to them some results in the literature for the particular case of the scoring rules, and also facilitates the study of the social choice properties considered in the paper: monotonicity, Pareto-optimality, immunity to the absolute winner paradox, Condorcet consistency, immunity to the absolute loser paradox and immunity to the Condorcet loser paradox.

Keywords: Positional voting systems; Cumulative standings functions; Social choice properties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-014-9412-8

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