Bounded Benefits of Representative Cooperativeness in Intergroup Negotiations

Özüm Saygı (), Lindred L. Greer, Gerben A. Kleef and Carsten K. W. De Dreu
Additional contact information
Özüm Saygı: University of Amsterdam
Lindred L. Greer: Stanford University
Gerben A. Kleef: University of Amsterdam
Carsten K. W. De Dreu: University of Amsterdam

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2015, vol. 24, issue 6, No 4, 993-1014

Abstract: Abstract Although cooperation among representatives in intergroup negotiation can improve intergroup relations, when cooperation in such competitive settings is attributed to strategic goals of the outgroup, it may actually harm intergroup relations. Here we investigate the possibility that representative’s characteristics (prototypicality and competence) determine whether an outgroup representative’s cooperation (as opposed to competition) improves or harms intergroup relations. Study 1 showed that a cooperative outgroup representative (compared to a competitive representative) produced more favorable perceptions of the entire outgroup, and triggered constructive behavioral tendencies towards the outgroup when the outgroup representative was seen as prototypical, yet decreased such constructive tendencies when the representative was seen as peripheral. Study 2 showed that the outgroup representative’s cooperation triggered constructive behavioral tendencies only when the representative appeared as low in competence; when high in competence, the positive effect of representative cooperativeness on trust and constructive behavioral tendencies was mitigated. Implications for representative negotiation and intergroup relations are discussed.

Keywords: Representative negotiations; Cooperation; Competence; Prototypicality; Outgroup perceptions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10726-014-9426-2 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:grdene:v:24:y:2015:i:6:d:10.1007_s10726-014-9426-2

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10726/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10726-014-9426-2

Access Statistics for this article

Group Decision and Negotiation is currently edited by Gregory E. Kersten

More articles in Group Decision and Negotiation from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().