Ranking Candidates Through Convex Sequences of Variable Weights
Bonifacio Llamazares
Group Decision and Negotiation, 2016, vol. 25, issue 3, No 5, 567-584
Abstract:
Abstract Scoring rules are a well-known class of positional voting systems where fixed scores are assigned to the different ranks. Nevertheless, since the winners may change according to the scores used, the choice of the scoring vector is not obvious. For this reason several methods have been suggested so that each candidate may be evaluated with the most favorable scoring vector for him/her. In this paper we propose a new model that allows to use different scoring vector for each candidate and avoid some shortcomings of other methods suggested in the literature. Moreover we give a closed expression for the score obtained by each candidate and, in this way, it is possible to rank the candidates without solving the proposed model.
Keywords: Scoring rules; Data envelopment analysis; Convex sequences of weights; Variable weights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10726-015-9452-8 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:grdene:v:25:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-015-9452-8
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10726/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s10726-015-9452-8
Access Statistics for this article
Group Decision and Negotiation is currently edited by Gregory E. Kersten
More articles in Group Decision and Negotiation from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().