Ambiguity in Problem Framing as a Barrier to Collective Actions: Some Hints from Groundwater Protection Policy in the Apulia Region

Raffaele Giordano (), Marcela Brugnach () and Irene Pluchinotta ()
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Raffaele Giordano: Water Research Institute - National Research Council
Marcela Brugnach: University of Twente
Irene Pluchinotta: Water Research Institute - National Research Council

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2017, vol. 26, issue 5, No 5, 932 pages

Abstract: Abstract Differences in problem framing and understanding are unavoidable in multi-actor decision-making processes, deeming ambiguous problem definitions and actions. The presence of ambiguity may have diverse implications. On the one hand, a diversity in frames can enhance the co-production of knowledge offering opportunities for innovative solutions. On the other hand, the presence of ambiguity can be a source of discrepancies or conflict in a group, hampering the implementation and/or reducing the effectiveness of environmental policy. This work demonstrates that neglecting ambiguity in problem framing leads decision-actors to simplify the interaction space by ignoring the role of some of the other decision-actors and/or making wrong assumptions about their mental models. Moreover, they act as if the system is as simple as the decision-actors presume it to be. To demonstrate these hypotheses, a Causal Loop Diagram method was implemented to investigate the policy resistance mechanisms hampering the implementation of sustainable groundwater abstraction policy in the Apulia Region (Southern Italy).

Keywords: Problem framing; Ambiguity analysis; Policy analysis; Causal Loop Diagram (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-016-9519-1

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