A Representative Committee by Approval Balloting

Begoña Subiza and Josep E. Peris

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2017, vol. 26, issue 5, No 10, 1029-1040

Abstract: Abstract A new voting rule for electing committees is described. Specifically, we use approval balloting and propose a new voting procedure that guarantees that if there is a committee that represents (with a given proportion of representatives) all of the existing voters, then the selected committee has to represent all of voters in at least the same proportion. This property is a way of selecting a committee that represents completely all of voters when such a committee exists. The usual voting rules in this context do not satisfy this condition.

Keywords: Approval balloting; Committee election; Unanimity; Justified representation; Representativeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-017-9527-9

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