Justifications and Questions in Detecting Deception

Jihyun Esther Paik () and Lyn M. Swol ()
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Jihyun Esther Paik: University of Wisconsin-Madison
Lyn M. Swol: University of Wisconsin-Madison

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2017, vol. 26, issue 6, No 1, 1060 pages

Abstract: Abstract Truth-tellers and deceivers use justifications to bolster their credibility, but given their different motivations, truth-tellers and deceivers may use justifications differently. Participants were assigned the role of allocator or recipient in an ultimatum game. Allocators received money based on their performance on a task and made an offer. Recipients did not have information about allocator’s task performance or amount the allocator received, and therefore, allocators could deceive. Liars provided more plausible details to support their offer by stating the structure of their task; this strategy backfired and led to more detection of lies. Truth-tellers were more likely to disclose advantageous information about their endowment of money in their justifications, and this reduced suspicion in their offers. Deceivers used more wrap-up questions to end the interaction; this did not help reduce partner suspicion. Asking questions in general did not improve detection accuracy.

Keywords: Lie; Deception; Justification; Question; Detection; Information asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-017-9536-8

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