A Non-cooperative Mechanism Yielding the Nucleolus of Airport Problems
M. J. Albizuri (),
J. M. Echarri () and
J. M. Zarzuelo ()
Additional contact information
M. J. Albizuri: The University of the Basque Country
J. M. Echarri: The University of the Basque Country
J. M. Zarzuelo: The University of the Basque Country
Group Decision and Negotiation, 2018, vol. 27, issue 1, No 8, 153-163
Abstract A non-cooperative approach is employed to solve the problem of allocating the total cost of building and maintaining an airport runway among its users. More precisely, it is proposed a non-cooperative bargaining game with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, and it is shown that the SPE outcome payoffs coincide with those prescribed by the nucleolus of the corresponding airport cooperative game.
Keywords: Airport problem; Non-cooperative mechanisms; Nucleolus; 91A12; 91A35; 91A80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10726-017-9551-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:grdene:v:27:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-017-9551-9
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Group Decision and Negotiation is currently edited by Gregory E. Kersten
More articles in Group Decision and Negotiation from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().