Coalition Formation and Stability
Antonio Magaña () and
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Antonio Magaña: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)
Francesc Carreras: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)
Group Decision and Negotiation, 2018, vol. 27, issue 3, No 8, 467-502
Abstract This paper aims to develop, for any cooperative game, a solution notion that enjoys stability and consists of a coalition structure and an associated payoff vector derived from the Shapley value. To this end, two concepts are combined: those of strong Nash equilibrium and Aumann–Drèze coalitional value. In particular, we are interested in conditions ensuring that the grand coalition is the best preference for all players. Monotonicity, convexity, cohesiveness and other conditions are used to provide several theoretical results that we apply to numerical examples including real-world economic situations.
Keywords: Game theory; TU cooperative game; Monotonicity; Superadditivity; Convexity; Cohesiveness; Shapley value; Coalition structure; Aumann–Drèze value; Strong Nash equilibrium; Stability; 91A12; C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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