Subgame Perfection and the Rule of k Names

Ignacio García-Jurado () and Luciano Méndez-Naya
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Ignacio García-Jurado: Universidade da Coruña
Luciano Méndez-Naya: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2019, vol. 28, issue 4, No 6, 805-825

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we revisit the rule of k names from a game theoretic perspective. This rule can be described as follows. Given a set of candidates for a position, a committee (formed by the proposers) selects k elements of that set using a screening rule; then a single individual from outside the committee (the chooser) chooses for the position one of the k selected candidates. In this context we first give conditions for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Then we provide conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria when the screening rule is $$\pi $$ π -majoritarian. Finally, we show that when the chooser can strategically appoint a delegate to choose on behalf of him, the conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria are weaker.

Keywords: Rule of k names; Screening rule; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Strong equilibrium; Delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-019-09625-6

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